Invisible hand equilibrium in family: the gravitation between men and women in marriage markets by Malakhov, Sergey
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Invisible hand equilibrium in family: the






MPRA Paper No. 108896, posted 25 Jul 2021 16:09 UTC
Sergey MALAKHOV 
Ph.D., Applied Economics,1998, 
Pierre-Mendès-France University 
 (Université Grenoble-Alpes), France 
  
Invisible Hand Equilibrium in Family: the gravitation between men 
and women in marriage markets. 
“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”  
Leo Tolstoy “Anna Karenina” 
 
Abstract 
The marginal analysis of consumer and producer behavior under wage and price 
dispersion discovers some previously unknown properties of optimality. Both parts in 
transaction are making satisficing choices, which unintentionally optimize their allocation of 
time, for a seller between production and services and for a buyer between labor, search, and 
leisure. This implicit optimization process results in a particular equilibrium, which can be 
regarded as the proof for the Invisible hand. Marriage markets can also produce the Invisible 
hand equilibrium close to the mating of unlikes but with some important differences. On 
commodity market corner solutions simply limit consumer behavior, but in marriage market 
they actively work and result in disequilibria of unhappy families, where either a husband or a 
wife starts to search leisure time with another partner and create the implicit polygamy. But 
Becker’s conclusion on polygamy as a substitution of one superior mate by several inferiors is 
true only for female polygamy or polyandry. For male polygamy, the optimal choice represents 
the total of opposite corner solutions, when an unattractive woman is complemented by an 
attractive lady, who cannot be chosen alone. While the ambiguous substitution effect of dowry 
can escape from corner solution, the substitution effect of bride price moves the family to the 
corner solution and results in the phenomenon of Femme Fatale Fate. Wealthy men and 
beautiful women really attract each other due to strong gravitational fields of both parts in 
transaction. But at the equilibrium a beautiful woman reduces the attractiveness of her partner’s 
wealth and cuts the time horizon of happy family. If the husband tries to support his 
attractiveness by gifts, the equilibrium fails, and a beautiful wife comes to the corner solution 
and searches for another partner. It is therefore not surprising that the common family position 
for a beautiful woman is the role of ‘beloved wife’ in the polygamy, either explicit or implicit, 
where she can efficiently use her strong gravitational field. 
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Introduction 
During last decades the economics of marriage has become one of the most dynamic 
domains in social sciences. The field of study by its nature enables the communication of 
economics with various disciplines like sociology, psychology, biology, anthropology, and 
history. And the economics of marriage itself represent a real methodological mosaic, leaving 
a space for different approaches, from neoclassical to institutional and behavioral ones, that 
have been thoroughly reviewed once by Chiaporri (2020). 
However, there is some ambiguity in the focus of analysis, when the notions of family, 
household, and marriage are using interchangeably, especially when studies are concerned with 
household behavior and the allocation of time in the family (Del Boca and Flinn 2013, Goussé 
et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the reasonings of household behavior revolve around the marital 
choice or the act of marriage itself. And here the prominent paper of Gary Becker on mating in 
marriage markets (Becker 1991) stays as one of the most influential study of the market 
workings in family decision-making. 
Becker successfully provided a methodological basis for the analysis of non-market 
values. The concept of imputed prices gave him an opportunity to analyze the output of the 
non-market productivity - of intelligence, education, health, religion, personality and even love, 
that maximize the aggregate output of the marriage market. Becker’s belief in market was so 
strong that he directly addressed to its invisible hand, which was leading selfish brides and 
grooms to the general equilibrium. 
This paper also represents the demonstration of the inner market mechanism, which 
produces the optimal choices, that can be treated as the workings of the Invisible hand. This 
approach is based on the proof of the Invisible hand on commodities markets (Malakhov 2020, 
Malakhov 2021a, Malakhov 2021b). But there, buyers and sellers are not selfish maximizers. 
They’re making under wage and price dispersion explicit satisficing choices that 
unintentionally and implicitly maximize both the output and utility. Optimal matchings, that 
mean under price dispersion successful meetings of buyers and sellers, who are spending time 
to search each other, occur automatically without explicit exchange of information. Moreover, 
while the equilibrium of the Invisible hand stays as the market phenomenon, wages and prices 
are constructing only the framework of the model, while the decision-making is provided by 
natural values of time and quantity. This feature of Invisible hand equilibrium looks very 
important especially for the analysis of marriage markets because in pre-historical hunter-
gatherer societies when market didn’t yet exist, the marital matchmaking could be the first 
sapling – a wife for a bag - of the phenomena of trade and exchange, and the bride price was 
the first price paid in the history of the civilization. The cliometrics of the family tells us, that 
“understanding of the households in the past is therefore important for understanding the way 
in which persistence of culture comes about. Moreover, it means that the behaviours observed 
when studying households are particularly likely to be transmitted from one generation to next, 
resulting in persistence of behaviour.” (Diebolt et al. 2019). The emotional Victorian Women 
Writers Project on marriage market (Corelli 1898) provides convincing evidence that in spite 
of the progress of civilization modern marriage markets have not went far away from the 
Babylonian Marriage Market, described by Herodotus almost five centuries BC. The brides’ 
market as the open-air trade and exchange exists even today, not only in Rome families in 
Bulgaria (Charlton 2015) but also in Shanghai, China. And being presented in its shadow form, 
brides’ trade – beauty for wealth – still exist. Even in England marriage markets can be locally 
identified with respect to indirect attributes of beauty and wealth (Bhroichain et al. 2002).  
In this way the equilibrium of the Invisible hand, which provides optimal trade between 
buyer and seller with respect to natural of values of time and quantity looks like an efficient 
tool for the understanding of modern marriage markets. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 briefly presents the equilibrium of the Invisible 
hand on commodity market. While it has been already described in published papers, it will be 
suitable for readers of this article to get it hand. There, the particular attention is paid to the 
limits of consumer behavior, i.e., to corner solutions. 
Part 2 applies the results from the Part 1 to the analysis of the model of the primitive 
exchange, where a hunter gets a woman’s beauty for his quarry, measured in some units, that 
give the difference between a small game and a big game along his production possibility 
frontier. 
Part 3 comes back to the corner solutions that result in marriage markets like unhappy 
families where either a husband or a wife gets a chance to spend some leisure time with another 
partner. 
Corner solution can be produced by bride price and dowry. In addition, corner solutions 
provide a basis for polygamy, which is described in Part 4.  
Part 5 formulates the hypothesis that the successful matching both on commodity and 
in marriage markets take place due to the gravitation either between buyer and seller or between 
a man and a woman. This hypothesis has been already presented in published papers on 
commodity markets. But there it doesn’t look very convincing, whereas here, in the analysis of 
marital choice, the mathematics of the equilibrium of the Invisible hand provides the striking 
illustration of the gravitational force, which confirms on the one hand the Becker’s justification 
of the “popular belief that more beautiful, charming and talented women tend to marry 
wealthier and more successful men” (Becker, op.cit.p.117), but on the other hand it disproves 
his conclusion that such an alliance maximizes the aggregate output, because it gives little 
chances for a beautiful women to be happy. 
 
Part 1. The equilibrium of Invisible hand on commodity market 
 The consumer reserves labor income wL0 and starts to search the satisficing price for 
the given quantity Q under price dispersion QP(S). He chooses the first price Pp below the 
reservation level, or wL=QPp <wL0. The purchase results in the value of total efforts of labor 
L and search S, which is equal to the consumer’s willingness to accept or to sell WTA=w(L+S). 
It is equal to the willingness to pay of shoppers, consumers with zero costs at the equilibrium 
price QPe, where the equilibrium price Pe is equal to both marginal and average costs on 
purchase of the searcher, the consumer with positive search costs. Divided by the value of 
marginal savings on purchase (-Q∂P/∂S), the equilibrium price gives the value of the time 
horizon until next purchase T=L+S+H, where H is leisure time to enjoy the purchased item: 
(1)				𝑤(𝐿 + 𝑆) = −𝑄 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑆 𝑇 = 𝑄𝑃/ 
Equation (1) represents the budget constraint for the utility function U(Q;H), which is 





𝐿 + 𝑆 = 𝑀𝑅𝑆(𝐻	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑄) 
As a result, the explicit satisficing purchase represents the implicit optimal 
consumption-leisure choice with respect to the equilibrium price. 
L’Hopital rule discovers stable preferences of spending total efforts (L+S) on 
consumption Q. The consumption Q is unit elastic with respect to total efforts (L+S) from the 
moment of intention to buy (𝐿, 𝑆, 𝑄,→ 0) until the moment of purchase QPp. It means that the 
purchase of any quantity equalizes marginal benefit of search or its marginal savings with the 
marginal loss in labor income, and the transformation of the budget constraint (Eq.1) proves 
this consideration: 





Equation (3) discovers the limits of consumer choice. If the absolute value of marginal 
savings on purchase is greater than the absolute value of marginal loss in labor income, this 
inequality represents the corner solution, when at the moment of intention to buy the consumer 
gives up the purchase because it is not worth efforts on it: 






𝐿 + 𝑆 >
𝑤
𝑃/ 
If the absolute value of marginal savings on purchase is less than the absolute value of 
marginal loss in labor income, this inequality represents the opposite corner solution, when at 
the moment of intention to buy the consumer gives up the purchase because it is not worth 
leisure time to spend on it: 






𝐿 + 𝑆 <
𝑤
𝑃/ 
Equation (4) leaves space for the arbitrage process. If the searcher unexpectedly finds 
very interesting price, he can re-sell the purchased item for a shopper at a price below the 
equilibrium level. As a result, the arbitrage starts, and it cleans the market from unexpectedly 
low prices by new equilibrium price. Equation (5) doesn’t leave space for the arbitrage because 
there the willingness to accept or to sell is greater than the equilibrium level, and the consumer 
cannot re-sell the purchased item. 
The producer knows nothing about the consumer. He allocates his time between 
production, farming, for example, Tf and delivery Td under constant working time 𝑇A + 𝑇B =
𝑇CDEFG. His total costs TC are constant as well as his returns to scale. He calculates his average 
costs AC, which gives him the price P equal to his marginal costs MC. He chooses the output 
Q along his production possibility frontier TC=QP, where production and delivery take time 
in different proportions with respect to the target quantity Q. While both average ACf and 
marginal costs MCf on production stay constant for any quantity to produced, both average ACd 
and marginal costs MCd on delivery are changing with respect to target quantity Q. So, the 
price P=MCf+MCd is also changing. It rises with the cut in production in favor of delivery. 
The total differential represents the ratio of quantity reduced in production dQf in favor of 
quantity to be delivered dQd, because the time for delivery Td reduces the time for production 
Tf : 
(6)				𝑑𝑄A𝑀𝐶A + 𝑑𝑄B𝑀𝐶B = 0 
As a result, the producer’s choices are limited by the sale on the site, where he devotes 
almost all his time for production Qmax, leaving some time for some service, packaging, for 
example, and the sale at the doors the quantity Qmin, demanded by shoppers, consumers with 
zero search costs. 
But under constant returns to scale the rate of product transformation RPT comes to the 
‘time in delivery – time in production’ ratio: 





We see that in any way the producer is selling not only goods but also some leisure 
time. It means that any buyer-and-seller meeting means some intersection of the producer’s 
frontier curve and the consumer’s utility curve.  
Equation (7) produces the meeting rule. The consumer knows nothing about the 
producer’s allocation of time, but their meeting means that the consumer definitely encounters 
some ‘time in delivery – time in production’ ratio. And when his MRS (H for Q) is equal to this 
ratio, it means that the seller’s price P satisfies him:  
(8.1)				𝑅𝑃𝑇 = 𝑇B𝑇A =
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆 = 𝑀𝑅𝑆 
(8.2)				𝑃 = 𝑀𝐶A +𝑀𝐶B = 𝑀𝐶A V1 + 𝑇B𝑇AW = 𝑀𝐶A X1 +
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆Y 
If MRS (H for Q) ≠ RPT, this inequality means that under the meeting rule the seller’s 
price is not equal to the buyer’s price, and the frontier curve intersects the utility curve. And it 
means that under constant costs TC=QP the producer has made a wrong choice of the quantity 
demanded, and the Pareto improvement doesn’t take place. However, if the buyer’s marginal 
rate of substitution of leisure for consumption is equal to the seller’s ‘time in delivery – time 
in farming ratio’, the seller’s price becomes equal to the buyer’s price. But it means that the 
utility curve is tangent to the frontier curve, and the satisficing price becomes optimal for both 
parts in transaction. 
Under constant returns to scale the quantity to be produced uniquely defines the 
allocation of time between production and delivery. And under unit elastic consumption the 
frontier-utility tangency tells us that the quantity produced is equal to the quantity demanded. 
It means that the producer’s price unintentionally optimizes the consumer’s allocation of time 
and maximizes his utility. The producer knows neither consumer’s willingness to pay nor his 
time spent on labor and search. When he chooses the quantity, it gives him the time for 
production, because his average costs on production are constant for any quantity. Then he 
subtracts the time for production from his total working time and gets the time of delivery, i.e., 
the way he should work up to the consumer. And if he correctly chooses the quantity to be 
produced, it might be the result of his experience, he comes with this quantity Q and its price 
P to the meeting point, where the consumer, who has spent labor time L and search time S, is 
waiting for him. 
 
Part 2. The equilibrium of Invisible hand in marriage market. 
The great advantage of the Invisible hand equilibrium is the opportunity to reduce the 
analysis to natural values of time and quantity.  When we start the analysis of marriage market, 
we should use the concept of imputed prices. But this concept stays less apparent than natural 
values and sometimes, like it takes place with the wage rate, this concept is deliberately 
obscured because any family faces not the wage rate itself but its marginal utility, which is very 
subjective. 
The idea to escape from imputed values turns the optics of the analysis to the primitive 
societies. However, as it was told in the Introduction, it is quite possible that modern marriage 
markets have inherited features from the history.  
Let’s take a hunter who is choosing a wife. It seems that the hunter is a buyer, and the 
bride is a seller. But the question what the bride can sell, immediately comes to her willingness 
to accept or to sell. She’s selling her beauty and her household skills. The homemaking needs 
time, but the beauty also needs time. Even today women can spend an average of 55 minutes 
every day primping, that comes out to almost 335 hours or 14 days every year (Women’s 
Health, Mar.3, 2014). And the history of cosmetics spans at least 7,000 years (Wikipedia, 
History of Cosmetics). Let’s suppose that bride’s natural beauty and the time of make-up at the 
equilibrium are inversely related. Less attractive bride needs more time for make-up, while 
very attractive bride can do without make-up at all. In addition, a wife can spend time on sewing 
and broidery. In general, the value L gives us the time of woman’s work, which cannot be 
redistributed to the husband. Of course, make-up and sewing can give her some pleasure, but 
it is no different from the pleasure of labor on a workplace. This is the price she’s paying to 
share the quarry. The voluntary or ‘net’ pleasure, which provides the utility, is produced by 
leisure time H also shared in the equilibrium family as well as quarry with her husband. Finally, 
the time horizon of the family T=L+S+H leaves for a wife some time S for homeworking, 
which can be redistributed, in contrast to the woman’s work during time L, to the husband. 
As a result, the woman’s willingness to accept or to sell equals to the total of her 
working and homemaking time, multiplied by some imputed unit value w, or WTAwife=w(L+S). 
The w value really is imputed. It might be esteemed as a unit beauty. The beauty like wage rate 
is dispersed on the market. Moreover, the history of marriage market gives an idea that there 
is some equilibrium beauty. For example, Babylonian marriage market was organized as the 
bride price – dowry auction, which started with the sale of the most beautiful maiden and 
progressed to the least. Swains paid the bride price for attractive maidens and got dowry for 
unattractive ones. It means that some beauty with ‘zero bride price – zero dowry’ existed.1 
Bride price and dowry will be analyzed later. For the moment, we accept another attribute for 
the equilibrium beauty: 
The equilibrium unit beauty we is the value that gives to a woman a possibility to 
redistribute all allocatable homemaking to the husband and to get the quarry at its 
equilibrium price Pe. 
On commodity market the Pe value gives to a customer a chance to buy at his doors. He 
becomes a shopper, the consumer with zero search costs. While other shoppers might have 
higher wage rates, they also pay the same competitive price at their doors. So, the price Pe is 
the lowest willingness to pay at the zero search level or the equilibrium price. Of course, if the 
commodity market works like an auction, consumers can offer prices over the equilibrium 
level. And this surplus is working like a bride price at the marriage auction. 
As a result, at the Pe level the husband takes all allocatable homemaking, first of all, the 
transformation of the quarry – butchering, salting, and cooking; all things that he has done as 
a bachelor and that he can do now in family without a loss of his reputation as a hunter.  
All these activities reduce quarry Q itself and rise its imputed price P until Pe by the 
added value. But, when hunter’s working time is constant, his total costs also stay constant as 
well as the price for the quarry QP. It means that there is some production possibility frontier, 
which represents the different trade-offs between the quantity and the price. If the hunter has 
some preferences, he can choose a target beauty, because for the given equilibrium price Pe the 
unit beauty w uniquely defines the quarry Q. By this way he gives a chance to both attractive 
and unattractive maiden to marry him. Both of them can maximize their utility with respect to 
their unit beauty. The attractive wife takes only woman’s work L, while the unattractive wife 
spends some time L on woman’s work and also takes all allocatable homemaking S. Got 
 
1 This ancient logic is nor too archaic, and it was confirmed once in modern times by Molière in ‘The Miser’ 
(S.M.) 
married with unattractive woman, the hunter spends all his working time in the forest and 
maximizes the quarry, while with attractive woman he cuts the quarry and makes all allocatable 
homemaking (Fig.1): 
 
Fig.1.Multiple equilibria for a hunter 
where Qforest – maximum output; Qdom – minimum output; Hforest – leisure time for maximum 
output; Hdom – leisure time for minimum output; Uunattractive – utility of unattractive wife; 
Uattractive – utility of attractive wife; Tat – family time horizon of attractive wife; Tun – time 
horizon for unattractive wife. 
Fig. 1 illustrates another important assumption. The quarry Q and leisure H are shared 
in the family. While we don’t know exact proportions of individual consumption, this 
simplification doesn’t look excessive. At the equilibrium, the wife and the husband consume 
together and spend leisure also together. 
Fig. 1 also precises the roles in the family. The hunter is ‘buying’ a wife, but when he 
does it, he brings in family the quarry.  He becomes a real breadwinner, or a ‘producer’. The 
lady is ‘selling’ her beauty and skills, but she consumes both quarry and leisure.  
There is some simple mathematics, which underlies these multiple equilibria. The 
hunter cannot get more female attractiveness above his PPF. It means that whatever choice he 
makes, he gets the same value: 
(9)				𝑄𝑃 = 𝑤𝐿 
where Q – the quarry; P – the imputed price of the unit of quarry; w – woman’s unit beauty; L 
– time of woman’s work.2 
 
2 Eq.9 resolves very important problem in spite of its simplicity. It presents implicit prices, w and P, for both parts 
in transaction. But any imputed price should be transformed into some measurable value. Here we can rely on 




















When the wife spends her time on butchering, salting, and grilling, all these activities 
reduce the imputed price P of the quarry Q. But she makes it because she is not attractive. The 
value of her unit beauty w is low, and she should also spend more time L on make-up and 
woman’s work at home. 
Of course, the wife would like to ‘sell herself’ at her total costs w(L+S). But her WTA 
cannot be greater than WTA of an attractive maiden. The WTA of attractive maiden is equal to 
her willingness to pay WTP. And her willingness to pay is based on the equilibrium unit beauty 
we, which gives her a chance to reallocate homemaking to the hunter and to get the quarry at 
the equilibrium price Pe. It means, that for the given quarry Q the WTA of unattractive wife is 
equal to the quarry times the equilibrium price Pe:  
(10)				𝑊𝑇𝐴NE\GGM\CGOQ/ = 𝑤(𝐿 + 𝑆) = 𝑊𝑇𝐴\GGM\CGOQ/ = 𝑊𝑇𝑃\GGM\CGOQ/ = 𝑄𝑃/ 
We see that the marriage market reproduces Eq. 1 and 2, and any point of the PPF 
represents some optimal trade-off w/Pe with respect to the individual unit beauty w and 
equilibrium price of quarry Pe. 
The hunter provides the quarry Q to be shared and allocates his working time between 
hunting (Tforest) and homemaking (Tdom), while the wife, allocating her working time between 
woman’s work L and homemaking S, provides leisure H to be shared. This framework 
exonerates the model from imputed prices, and we come to the sufficient condition, that any 
happy family represents some Invisible hand equilibrium, which can be described by the 
meeting rule we have derived from the analysis of the commodity market, but here we put the 
imputed prices into curve brackets, reducing the analysis to the level of natural values: 




𝐿 + 𝑆 = 𝑀𝑅𝑆 
where RPT – rate of product (quarry) transformation; MRS – marginal rate of substitution of 
leisure H for consumption Q; w/Pe – relative attractiveness. 
The graphic exposition of happy family looks as follows (Fig.2): 
 
be fair. Unequal contributions appear only in corner solutions. Thus, Eq.9 appears and resolves the problem of the 
calculation of imputed prices (S.M.)  
 
Fig.2.Equilibrium of happy family 
We see that it is very difficult to analyze the Invisible hand equilibrium in the marriage 
market with the straightforward Becker’s methodology. On one hand, it looks like the mating 
of unlikes: a superior woman decreases the hunter’s productivity as well as inferior woman 
raises it. Quarry and beauty are inversely related on the PPF. But on the other hand, attractive 
wife raises husband’s productivity at home as well as lucky hunter also raises the household 
productivity of his wife. In addition, it is very difficult to evaluate here the household 
productivity, because for both parts in transaction it is taken on basis of opportunity costs – 
man’s household activity equals to the quarry lost, and woman’s household activity equals to 
the time lost for woman’s work.  
There is an important difference between commodity market and marriage market. On 
commodity market, the producer doesn’t know consumer’s wage rate. The only information he 
needs is the quantity demanded. This is the quantity demanded, which allocates his time. But 
in marriage market the hunter gets the visible information about woman’s beauty. But like the 
value of quantity demanded Q on commodity market, the value of unit beauty w uniquely 
defines the allocation of his working time with respect to his physical capacities. He’s 
evaluating the beauty of a bride and decides how much time he should spend at home and in 
the forest. And the quarry Q becomes the residual value of his choice with respect to his hunting 
skills. If his evaluation is correct, the family will be happy. If he makes a mistake, his choice 
results in the disequilibrium. 
Here the imputed value of relative female attractiveness w/Pe plays an important role. 

















(12)				𝑃 = 𝑀𝐶A +𝑀𝐶B = 𝑀𝐶A V1 + 𝑇B𝑇AW = 𝑀𝐶A X1 +
𝑤
𝑃/Y 3 
At the equilibrium the relative attractiveness uniquely defines both the hunter’s 
allocation of time and respective imputed price of the quarry. If the hunter underestimates the 
unit beauty w of his wife, he will spend on hunting more time, the Td/Tf ratio is low, than the 
wife needs. She is ready to pay high imputed price for the quarry with high added value of 
husband’s home activities. On the other hand, if the hunter overestimates the unit beauty of his 
wife, he will try to make more work at home, the Td/Tf ratio is high, while his wife is ready to 
do it herself. We see, that in any case hunting efficiency and beauty are inversely related, while 
they are directly related with homemaking, i.e., the care. 
However, it is too early to write off Becker’s methodology. If we pragmatically look at 
the constant hunter’s costs by the optics of the quantity-price relationship, we understand that 
PPF exposes only the substitution effect with zero income effect. Real marriage market 
depends on specific income effects, produced by bride price and dowry, which take in the 
modern society such forms as pre-marital wealth and parental support. But before we start to 
analyze these income effects, we should understand the limits of Invisible hand equilibrium, 
when income effect equals to zero. 
 
Part 3. Corner solutions and disequilibria in marriage markets. 
Consumer’s corner solutions both on commodity and marriage markets that limit the 
Invisible hand equilibrium don’t represent complex calculations. They’re based on simple 
reasonings – either the quantity demanded is not worth efforts, or it is not worth leisure. 
However, people often disregard even commonsense reasoning. It seems that this mistake is 
more common on commodity market, where mistakes are not so painful. But it is not so. All 
the history of marital choice tells us that people are making this mistake in family.  
Let’s take an unattractive bride who wants to marry a lucky hunter ‘at any costs’. She 
chooses the target quarry to be shared in the family and starts to search. But when she is 
unaware of a groom’s PPF, she can make a mistake. Her motivation to get married at any costs 
can play a dirty trick. She is ready to give up leisure and to please her husband; she is also 
ready to take over the household. But it might be not enough for a lucky hunter. If his 
 
3 The family case precises the MCf value. On commodity market, where there is no explicit exchange of 
information, it can be derived only on competitive basis under the division of labor, when a trader is buying goods 
for re-sale on the farm at competitive price. But in primitive society there is some social norm, how much quarry 
the ‘respectable’ hunter should bring in a day, which gives the MCf value for both parts in transaction (S.M.) 
possibilities are great, there he is left to endure suboptimal leisure Hsub. The value Td/Th in the 
family is too low for him; he can please his wife by suboptimal leisure Hsub and to get some 
more leisure time until H*. And he simply goes out to play cards or to search an attractive 
partner with high unit beauty w (Fig.3): 
 
Fig.3. Husband’s excess leisure 
It happens because according to Equation (5), this choice represents for unattractive 
wife the corner solution. Her unit beauty is less than the equilibrium beauty w of attractive 
maiden. The unattractive woman accepts the quarry offered but it takes too much her working 
and homemaking time, that cuts her leisure to spend with her husband. This is a result of the 
decision to get married at any costs:  
(13) 𝑄𝐿 + 𝑆 <
𝑇B𝑇A = ]
𝑤
𝑃/^ ⟹ 𝑤(𝐿 + 𝑆) > 𝑄𝑃/ 
Here, the unattractive bride is trying to ‘sell’ herself at a price greater than the price of 
the beautiful brides at the local market. But her choice might be optimal, if she finds a hunter 
with a lower PPF – the consideration, which confirms Becker’s conclusion that inferior woman 
chooses inferior man. 
The commodity market is more organized than the marriage market. Its Invisible hand 
doesn’t go beyond Wealth of Nations, and an optimistic searcher cannot re-sell the purchased 
item at the door for a shopper at the price greater than the equilibrium price. This is not for 
marriage market, because its Invisible hand also depends there on Moral Sentiments. The 
predatory female motivation to get lucky hunter to marry her makes him unhappy and he will 
suffer from suboptimal leisure. But sometimes this decision is taken by the lucky hunter 
himself. He chooses unattractive wife to please him and to make home; then he gets spare time 















The opposite corner solution also falls under reasonings of Moral Sentiments. If a 
beautiful bride chooses a lucky hunter, who is not so thoughtful and who has no intention to 
spend much time at home, she gets the corner solution because his RPT= Td/Tf is less than her 
marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption.  As a result, she gets only ‘corner’ 
amount of leisure, and she starts to look for another partner, who can provide her more leisure 
time (Fig.4): 
 
Fig.4. Wife’s excess leisure 
Here the corner solution is described as follows: 
(14) 𝑄𝐿 + 𝑆 >
𝑇B𝑇A = ]
𝑤
𝑃/^ ⟹ 𝑤(𝐿 + 𝑆) < 𝑄𝑃/ 
This corner solution is produced by high female self-esteem, or by high imputed value 
of unit beauty w. This is a real problem for the family because Figure 4 looks again like the 
visual confirmation of Gary Becker’s assumption that more beautiful women are choosing 
more productive men as well as his understanding of the implicit polygamy, when “polygamy 
can match the total resources of a superior man or woman by substituting several inferior for 
one superior mate” (Becker, op.cit., p.125). Really, if we take into account the total husband’s 
productivity, both in forest and at home, we can say that a beautiful woman makes the 
equilibrium choice at the upper PPF, which can be provided by one superior male or by several 
inferior males.  
 We see that both corner solutions can be settled down by some shift of the production 
possibility frontier. Marriage market produces PPF shifts by its specific income effects of bride 
















Part 4. Bride price, dowry, and polygamy. 
We see that corner solutions are produced by woman’s self-esteem, which results in 
disequilibrium unit beauty w. But there are more fundamental inner workings of corner 
solutions, which can be derived from the male allocation of time. 
Let’s take a hunter who is ready to pay the bride price. We can suppose that the bride 
price needs hunting to start before marriage, and hunter comes in the marriage market with 
some bag. Get married, he continues hunting and starts homemaking. (Fig.5): 
 
Fig.5. Hunting for bride price 
But we see that whenever hunting starts, in any way it results in some PPF, described 
by the allocation of time ratio. But with regard to the equilibrium (Eq.11), the bride price 
increases the time on hunting and decreases the RPT. As a result, the MRS should also fall to 
meet the lower RPT.  
The fall in MRS for the given quarry Q can be produced either by low unit beauty w or 
by more total efforts of woman’ work L and homemaking S. While all the history of marriage 
markets tells us that bride price and beauty correlate, the first assumption of the low unit beauty 
is less reasonable. But it means that both parts in transaction have different views on the bride 
price. For a maiden or for her family the bride price means the price for the beauty. For a lucky 
hunter, who has brought to the marriage market his bag, the bride price means more woman’s 
work and homemaking. It means that the corner solution (Eq.13) appears at the level of 
expectations, like it happens on commodity market, where corner solution appears not at the 
moment of purchase but at the moment of intention to buy. In marriage market a woman, a 
‘consumer’, should understand that the quarry demanded is not worth her efforts. But accepting 
the bride price, she voluntarily comes to the corner in the family. Literally, she becomes a 

















Let’s take a hunter, who intends to marry an attractive woman at the equilibrium level, 
where he is ready to take all homemaking, leaving for his wife only woman’s work L. But the 
bride price makes him to bring to the market some reserves of his quarry. The bride price 
income effect shifts PPF upwards to the right. But the bride price changes his allocation of 
time. For the new PPF the hunter should spend more time on hunting. As a result, the RPT 
falls; the bride price substitution effect shits the optimal choice to the left. There, the hunter 
expects to get from his wife not only working time, but also homemaking time S. But for an 
attractive lady this husband’s choice represents the corner solution (Fig.6): 
 
Fig.6. Income and substitution effects of bride price 
It seems, that the settlement of the corner solution can take place, if the hunter finds 
resources to cut wife’s both working time L and homemaking time S. He can surround her by 
maids. But he should pay for them. And the only source at his disposal is again the hunting.  
Maids consume some quarry; they start to do not only the woman’s work but also 
homemaking S and shift lady’s choice along the utility curve down to the right. But the hunter 
stays at the hunting level of bride price BPh. The family disappears. The couple share the quarry 
Q*, which is equal to the quarry at BPh less maid’s consumption, but not leisure. The wife takes 
some L time on make-up and her optimal leisure H*. But the husband spends with her only Hsub 
time. The question is how the lady spends the (H*-Hsub) time? It might be a company with a 
male with low hunting and high homemaking skills, say, a cook or a gardener. 
The dowry effect is less clear because it depends on the tangible form of the dowry. 
The dowry income effect shits the PPF inward. But there the substitution effect is ambiguous. 
If it reduces the costs involved in setting up a new household, the dowry reduces the Td value 
for the husband; the Td/Th ratio falls, and the optimal hunter’s choice moves to the left. As a 














unattractive wife. But in monetary form, if money already exist, the dowry cuts hunting time. 
The optimal hunter’s choice shifts down to the right. By this way the dowry raises the Td/Th 
ratio, and it results in the corner solution (Eq.12). The husband comes to equilibrium at E where 
he gets his optimal leisure H* (Fig.7). But his unattractive wife can give him only suboptimal 
leisure Hsub. And he starts go to football and to play cards, or to search another lady for leisure. 
For that he can use the part of dowry and to move along the PPF or to increase hunting time in 
order to share both optimal quarry and leisure with two women. 
 
Fig.7. Income and substitution effects of dowry 
The analysis of corner solutions, bride price and dowry give an idea that with respect 
to the equilibrium (Eq.11) the polygamy doesn’t represent the substitution of one superior mate 
by several inferiors. It might be some combination, when one corner solution is complemented 
by the opposite corner solution in order to produce in total the optimal choice. 
Here the question of mathematical model arises. In its simple form the equilibrium 
solution (Eq.11) is transformed either into the polygamy equilibrium: 
(15)				𝑇B𝑇A =_
𝑄O(𝐿O + 𝑆O) 
or into the polyandry equilibrium: 
(16)				_𝑇B𝑇A =
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆 
By this way Eq.15 and 16 confirm the substitution of one superior mate by several 
inferior. But behind the back of natural values there are imputed values of the equilibrium price 
Pe and unit beauty w. And we get the problem. While the equilibrium price stays the same 
along the given PPF, the unit beauty doesn’t. And it is very difficult to summarize unit beauties. 















month. Here we need some mean value. This consideration doesn’t change Eq.16, and 
polyandry stays as the total of inferior choices. But polygamy doesn’t. The polygamy 








But it means that got married with unattractive woman under corner solution from 
Eq.13, in order to make the optimal choice the hunter should complement it by the corner 
solution from Eq.14. Then he can share both quarry and leisure with many women like it is 
presented at Fg.7.4 
There, the equilibrium beauty 𝑤abbb is a mean value. It means that when one wife is 
unattractive, the other wife should be more attractive even than an attractive maiden at the 
equilibrium level. The hunter cannot get very attractive woman alone because this choice 
produces the corner solution (Eq.14) for the wife. And the polygamy, either explicit or implicit, 
gives him a chance to get very beautiful woman.  
The interest of very beautiful woman in polygamy is quate obvious. Both explicit and 
implicit forms redistribute the allocation of time (L+S) between wives even when their shares 
in quarry qi, like it is prescribed by sharia, are equal. In general, the unattractive wife takes all 
the homework and a big part of women’s work. And the greater is the beauty of ‘beloved’ wife 
wi, the higher is her MRS =wi/Pe=qi/Li with respective high share in quarry qi and low share in 
woman’s work Li with zero homemaking Si=0. 
The last consideration confirms the idea that the optics of commodity market can be 
used for the analysis of the family, because polygamy represents an equilibrium where a 
producer sells his output to many buyers. And it also confirms the hypothesis that there is some 
force, which attracts beautiful women to lucky hunters, and vice versa. The Invisible hand 
equilibrium provides some grounds for this hypothesis. It seems, that there is gravitation 
between men and women, which depends on quarry and allocation of time like it takes place 
between buyers and sellers on commodity market.  
 
Part 5. The gravitation between men and women. 
 
4 It looks like the general rule for both parts in transaction: when partner’s trait is measurable, say, a natural value, 
the substitution of one superior mate by several inferiors takes place by the direct summation. If the partner’s trait 
is not measurable, say, an imputed value, the derivation of mean value and the total of opposite corner solutions 
takes place. (S.M.). 
The mathematics of the gravitation between men and women is the same as for sellers 
and buyers. But here it becomes more perceptible because corner solutions, which are taken as 
simple constraints on commodity market, stay active in marriage market, because unhappy 
families cannot be written off from the analysis of the equilibrium. 
We start with the assumption that a bride before she makes a choice doesn’t know the 
total hunter’s costs of time. Moreover, it doesn’t interest her. She has some preferences how 
much quarry Q and how much leisure H should be shared. It means that for any quarry there is 
some transformation rate 𝛿 of total hunter’s time (Tf+Td) into family leisure time H, or 
(18)				𝐻 = 𝛿(𝑇A + 𝑇B) 
The hunter also has some preferences how his time should be allocated between hunting 
and homemaking. But whatever allocation he makes, the total time stays constant with regard 
to his physical abilities. And husband’s constant total costs result with regard to Eq.9 in 
constant wife’s cost wL for any unit beauty w. This consideration gives a possibility to assume 
that for any optimal choice there is a normal from the origin of family woman’s allocation of 
time. Hunter’s PPF has a particular attribute – whatever change in hunting skills takes place, 
the PPF doesn’t change its shape like it happens under technological progress on commodity 
market; it simply shifts outward because the progress in hunting skills changes both quantities 
lost in hunting and got for consumption in the same proportion. As a result, the normal from 
the origin to the equilibrium choice produces the geometry of happy family (Fig.8): 
 
The geometry confirms the assumption that the equilibrium doesn’t need imputed 
monetary values, and it can be derived with the help of natural values. And the geometry of 
happy family results in the following equation: 
















However, when we speak about optimal woman’s choice, we understand that man’s 
optimal choice is implicitly presented with its optimal allocation of time: 
(20.1)				𝐻 = 𝑄d 𝑇B𝑇A  
(20.2)				𝑄d = 𝐻(𝐿 + 𝑆) = 𝛿(𝑇A + 𝑇B)(𝐿 + 𝑆) 
(20.3)				𝛿 = 𝑄d(𝑇A + 𝑇B)(𝐿 + 𝑆) 
(20.4)				𝛿O = 𝑄LDPRe\fR(𝑇A + 𝑇B)
𝑞O(𝐿O + 𝑆O) 
We see that the transformation rate 𝛿 represents the product of quantities supplied and 
consumed, divided by the product of time that both parts in transaction have spent to meet each 
other, i.e., to spend leisure together. Eq.20.3 and 20.4 really look like specific forms of 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation, where quantities represent ‘masses’, and the distance is 
substituted by time. It means, that that the transformation rate 𝛿 can measure a gravitational 
force between a man and a woman.5 Its physical nature becomes more evident, if we re-write 




5 The hypothesis of gravitational force specifies the production possibility frontier. Let’s take a simple example 
of a hunter, who can get 20 units of quarry in 10 days. The allocation of his time between Tf and Td produces the 
straight-line Q=20-H, where H is equal to a half a day lost for hunting. If he really is indifferent to the allocation 
of his time, he can make happy any woman along this straight-line frontier. But for a chosen unit beauty w he 
should allocate his time with respect to the meeting rule (Eq.8.2 and Eq.12). As a result, the value of leisure time 
H, as well as the following (L+S) and T values, appears here with the help of Eq.20.1: 
TC Q P -dQf/dQd MCf=ACf MCd=ACd Td/Tf H L+S T Ó 
10 20 0,500 0,000 0,500 0,000 0,000 0 n/a ∞ 0 
10 19 0,526 0,053 0,500 0,026 0,053 1 361,000 362,000 0,1 
10 18 0,556 0,111 0,500 0,056 0,111 2 162,000 164,000 0,2 
10 17 0,588 0,176 0,500 0,088 0,176 3 96,333 99,333 0,3 
10 16 0,625 0,250 0,500 0,125 0,250 4 64,000 68,000 0,4 
10 15 0,667 0,333 0,500 0,167 0,333 5 45,000 50,000 0,5 
10 14 0,714 0,429 0,500 0,214 0,429 6 32,667 38,667 0,6 
10 13 0,769 0,538 0,500 0,269 0,538 7 24,143 31,143 0,7 
10 12 0,833 0,667 0,500 0,333 0,667 8 18,000 26,000 0,8 
10 11 0,909 0,818 0,500 0,409 0,818 9 13,444 22,444 0,9 
10 10 1,000 1,000 0,500 0,500 1,000 10 10,000 20,000 1 
10 9 1,111 1,222 0,500 0,611 1,222 11 7,364 18,364 1,1 
10 8 1,250 1,500 0,500 0,750 1,500 12 5,333 17,333 1,2 
10 7 1,429 1,857 0,500 0,929 1,857 13 3,769 16,769 1,3 
10 6 1,667 2,333 0,500 1,167 2,333 14 2,571 16,571 1,4 
10 5 2,000 3,000 0,500 1,500 3,000 15 1,667 16,667 1,5 
10 4 2,500 4,000 0,500 2,000 4,000 16 1,000 17,000 1,6 
10 3 3,333 5,667 0,500 2,833 5,667 17 0,529 17,529 1,7 
10 2 5,000 9,000 0,500 4,500 9,000 18 0,222 18,222 1,8 
10 1 10,000 19,000 0,500 9,500 19,000 19 0,053 19,053 1,9 
 
or the gravitational force equals to the product of male productivity Qj/Tj and female relative 
attractiveness wi/Pe. 
While in reality we know neither the production possibility frontier nor the utility curve, 
the last consideration looks like the basis for the understanding of relationship between men 
and women because with respect to the theory of gravitation the productivity exhibits the male 
gravitational field, and the attractiveness exhibits the female gravitational field. This 
reasoning gives the understanding why wealthy men and beautiful women really attract each 
other, but they have little chances to create a happy family.  
This consideration results in a specific phenomenon that can be called as Femme Fatale 
Fate. At the equilibrium a beautiful woman reduces a gravitational field of her partner. When 
total working time (Tf+Td) is constant along the frontier, the value Q is falling.  But the value 
(L+S) is falling more rapidly than the quarry, and the beautiful woman increases her own 
gravitational field. The growth of her gravitational field can save the family because ∂𝛿/∂Q is 
negative along the frontier. But the cost of the gravitational force’s growth is high. A beautiful 
wife enforces her husband to make her life comfortable but with that he becomes less attractive 
in her eyes with respect to Eq.22. As a result, multiple family equilibria, presented at Fig.1, 
propose the short time horizon for the family with a beautiful wife.  
The husband can sense the fall of his gravitational field. However, it is difficult to 
imagine that a hunter, once got married with a beautiful lady, changes his preferences and starts 
to sweet her off her feet. It is more natural for him to compensate the fall of his attractiveness 
by gifts – clothing, jewelry, yachts. But with that he should increase his hunting time. And the 
fragile equilibrium of the family with the beautiful lady immediately fails. Rising hunting time, 
the husband decreases his Td/Tf time allocation ratio and produces for his wife the corner 
solution. And she starts to look for another partner. It is therefore not surprising that the 
common family position for a beautiful woman is the role of ‘beloved wife’ in the polygamy, 
either explicit or implicit, where she can efficiently use her strong gravitational field. 
 
Conclusion 
While the gravitation is more evident in marriage market than on commodity market, it 
adds some understanding for sales. Producers with strong gravitational field like Coca-Cola 
don’t need consumers’ attractiveness and high purchasing power. The economy on scale needs 
many low-income consumers, while Chateau Lafitte Rothschild needs few high-income 
consumers. We see that the hypothesis of gravitation, presented here, and the initial Adam 
Smith’s gravitation metaphor, associated with the natural price, might overlap. From the very 
beginning the Invisible hand equilibrium discovers the gravity of the equilibrium price, which 
equalizes the willingness to accept of consumers with positive search costs. But on the other 
hand, this is a purchase price, which attracts consumers. As a result, the producer’s 
gravitational field and the purchase price are inversely related, and Coca-Cola’ field is stronger 
that that one of Chateau Lafitte Rothschild. But the total gravitational force between Chateau 
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